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FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE AMERICAN 
POOR LAWS: I* 
Daniel R. Mandelkert 
"And be it further enacted, That the father and grandfather, the 
mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, 
lame and impotent person, or other poor person not able to work, 
being of a sufficient ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and 
maintain every such poor person . ... " 
43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, § 7 (1601) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EVER since the enactment of the statute quoted above, first passed in 1597 as part of the original Elizabethan Poor Law, 
the concept of family responsibility has been linked with the public 
relief of the poor. Today, more than three-and-a-half centuries 
later, the basic, residual program of poor relief has survived in 
the statutes of every American jurisdiction, and practically all 
the states still have family responsibility provisions based on the 
English model.1 Although some jurisdictions have abandoned the 
• This paper consists of a chapter, with some revisions, of a thesis submitted to the 
Law School of Yale University in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the J.S.D. 
degree. Work on this thesis was undertaken by the author during his tenure of a fellow-
ship granted by the Fund for the Advancement of Education. However, it represents the 
independent work of the author, and he is solely responsible for it. 
t B.A. 1947, LL.B. 1949, University of Wisronsin; Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana 
University.-Ed. 
1 The program of poor relief, general relief, or general assistance, which is the sub-
ject of this paper, should be distinguished from categorical public assistance. Categorical 
assistance comprehends the programs of Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid to 
Dependent Children, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. These programs 
are financed by the states and local governments with federal financial help, are state-
administered or state-supervised, and must conform to minimum standards prescribed by 
state statute in order to qualify for federal aid. See Geddes, "Programs of Public Assistance 
in the United States," 70 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 132 (1950). Family responsibility provisions, 
it should be noted, may also be frequently found in these programs. 
It is the function of general assistance to furnish aid to persons not covered by cate-
gorical assistance or other programs of social insurance, and, in some areas, to supple-
ment grants and awards under any of these other programs. General assistance remains 
the financial and administrative responsibility of the state and local governments, and is 
not subject to state supervision in every jurisdiction. For a brief review of general assist-
ance see Mandelker, "The American Poor Laws: A Legislative Backwater," 41 A.B.A.J. 
567 (1955). Many of the American family responsibility statutes have not been substan-
tially changed since the date of their original adoption as long as 260 years ago. See, e.g., 
Plymouth v. Hey, 285 Mass. 357, 189 N.E. 100 (1934); McGarr v. National &: Providence 
Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902). Citations to the American family responsi-
bility laws follow. If there is a series of provisions relating to family responsibility, only 
the first section has been cited. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 44, §8; Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, 
§13; Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) §70-605; Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §83-607 [repealed 
Ark. Laws of 1955, c. 37]; Cal. Civ. Code (1949) §206; Cal. Welfare &: Inst. Code (1952) 
§2576; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §1; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §!Ille; Del. Code 
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family responsibility requirement, the tendency in recent years 
seems to be toward strengthening the law where it exists. 
In spite of their historic antecedents, and their place in the 
statutory framework of poor relief since colonial times, the Amer-
ican family r.esponsibility laws have never been comprehensively 
reviewed. Yet, their importance in the administration of poor re-
lief, or general assistance as it is now more commonly called, can-
not be underestimated. As the discus~ion of legislative purpose 
will show, these laws, by authorizing court. actions in which sup-
port may be sought from responsible relatives, provide an alter-
native to public assistance. The assumption is that when an in-
dividual falls into need, his first recourse is to his family. 
To understand the nature of the family responsibility laws it 
is first necessary to differentiate them from those family support 
duties imposed at common law or by other statutory provisions. 
One common law duty of support which does not appear to be 
questioned is that of a husband to support his wife.2 In England, 
Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501; Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §23-2302; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) c. 
298, §12,290; Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §32-1002; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §§436-12, 
439-2; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1955) §3-3001 (domestic relations law); Iowa Code 
Ann. (1949) §252.1; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §13:4731; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) art. 229: 
Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97 (general assistance law); Me. Laws (1953) c. 163 (hospital 
care); Me. Laws (1953) c. 386 (domestic relations law); Mass. Laws Ann. (1949) c. 117, 
§6; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.121; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.01; Miss. Code 
Ann. (1952) §7357; Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) §205.590; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) 
§71-233; Neb. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1949) §5140 
(general assistance); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1949) §5140.01 (hospital care); N.H. Rev. 
Laws (1942) c. 124, §18; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1940) §44:1-139; N.Y. Social Welfare Law (Supp. 
1955) §101; N.Y. Criminal Code (1945) §914; N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court. Act 
§§92, 101; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0910 (domestic relations law); N.D. Rev. Code 
(1943) §50-0119 (general assistance law); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) tit. 51, 
§5113.04; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1951) tit. 10, §§11, 12 (domestic relations law); Ore. Rev. 
Stat. (1953) §109.010 (domestic relations law); Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.410 (general 
assistance law); Pa. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 62, §1971; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §5; S.C. 
Code (1952) §71-131; S.D. Code (1939) §14.0312 (domestic relations law); Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) §17-14-1; Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, §2; Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88 (domestic 
relations law); W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (150); Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01. · 
Unless the contrary is indicated, all of these statutes are found in the general assist-
ance law, or in the public assistance law if that statute covers general assistance as well 
as the categorical programs. In practically every case, a civil remedy is provided; none 
of these statutes are criminal statutes. Citations to statutory supplements and to session 
laws have been given only where the first section of the statute has been amended. For . 
a chart showing family responsibility provisions for all welfare programs for all states, 
as of July 1, 1952, see the Tax Foundation, Improving Public Assistance Table 7 (1953). 
See the recent survey made by an Alabama legislative committee, THE REsPoNSIBILITY 
OF A CHILD TO SUPPORT INDIGENT PARENT (Alabama Legislative Reference Service 1950). 
Family responsibility statutes do not appear to exist in Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and "Wyoming. Arkansas repealed 
its family responsibility law in its entirety in 1955. Ark. Laws, c. 37. 
2 1 BLACKST. COMM. •442; PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §78 (1930). For an 
early case see Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109, 82 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1659). Most courts now 
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no other family duties of support appear to have existed, and a 
minority of the American courts follow the English view.3 A 
majority of the American jurisdictions, however, have also found 
a common law duty of a father to support his minor child.4 
Statutes in almost every jurisdiction now compel the sup-
port of the spouse and minor children. Most of these are criminal 
statutes penalizing nonsupport5 or the abandonment of a wife 
and children likely to become public charges.6 In addition, some 
statutes have been enacted which impose criminal penalties on 
adult children who fail to support their indigent parents,7 and 
which compel the support of illegitimate children by putative 
fathers.8 In contrast to these common law and statutory support 
duties, the family responsibility statutes are non-criminal statutes 
allow the wife to sue the husband directly for support. Brown, "The Duty of the Hus• 
band to Support the Wife," 18 Va. L. REv. 823 (1932). 
3 See the discussion by Cockburn, J., in Bazeley v. Forder, [1868] 3 Q.B. 559 at 565; 
PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §126 (1930). For an American case taking this view 
see Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378 (1875). Although New Hampshire is listed 
with the American minority, see Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N.H. 86 (1827). 
4 PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §126 (1930); comment, 32 YALE L.J. 825 (1923). 
For an early case asserting this proposition see Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 281 
(1819). People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896), holding constitutional the Illinois 
family responsibility law, assumes the existence of the common law duty. There was, 
apparently, no common law duty of the minor child to support his parent. Waterbury v. 
Hurlburt, I Root (Conn.). 60 (1773). See In re Erickson, 104 Kan. 521, 180 P. 263 (1919) 
(dictum); 15 CoL. L. REv. 281 (1915). Traditionally, the duty of the parent was not 
enforceable in a direct action by the child but in an action against the parent by a third 
party who had furnished necessaries. This limits the effectiveness of the rule. HARPER, 
PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 503 (1952). The common law support duties are also enforce• 
able, of course, in divorce actions. 
5 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §234 (1936). 
6 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §162 (1935). The following statutes are 
typical: Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.10; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §16.130; N.J. Rev. Stat. 
(Supp. 1954) §44:1-143. Typically, these statutes also provide that the property of the 
deserter may be seized for the support of his dependents. For a case discussing problems 
of interpretation arising under such a statute, see People v. Triangle, 23 Barb. (N.Y.) 
236 (1956). 
7 E.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1942) §10-1410; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §405.080; Md. 
Ann. Code Gen. Laws (Supp. 1955) art. 27, §ll2; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) tit. 
29, §2901.40. For cases indicating the nature of the support obligation under statutes of 
this type, see, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 213 Ind. 125, II N.E. (2d) 698 (1937); Lundy v. 
State, 195 Ind. 368, 145 N.E. 485 (1924); Beutel v. State, 36 Ohio App. 73, 172 N.E. 838 
(1930). 
An Ohio court, in Gardner v. Hines, (Ohio C.P. 1946) 68 N.E. (2d) 397, has held that 
the criminal statute cannot serve as the basis for a civil action. But cf. Craig v. Shea, 102 
Neb. 575, 168 N.W. 135 (1918) (illegitimate child may bring civil action under criminal 
statute penalizing father who does not support his illegitimate child). Sometimes the 
family responsibility law compelling civil support in connection with general assistance 
will carry a criminal penalty. E.g., Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88. Of course, the criminal 
statutes may have the effect of compelling support. 
s 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §250 (1936). The American support statutes are 
exceedingly complex and overlapping, but the text furnishes a rough outline of their 
general provisions. 
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which provide that dependent persons in need may secure aid 
from responsible relatives who are able to contribute to their sup-
port. 
A. Purpose and History of Family Responsibility Legislation 
A consideration of the reasons behind a given piece of legis-
lation is often essential to its interpretation. This is particularly 
necessary in the case of family responsibility laws, whose general-
ized provisions leave many specific problems of interpretation 
unresolved. In the case of family responsibility the problem is 
to determine the reasons for the adoption of the original English 
provision, from which the American laws were taken. 
Unfortunately, the available historical material does not appear 
to disclose these reasons.9 Furthermore, neither the 1597 nor the 
1601 poor relief acts contain preambles, so recourse may not even 
be had to that source of legislative intent. Nevertheless, inferences 
may be drawn regarding the apparent purpose of the statute from 
several items of legislative history. 
In 1575 Parliament passed a law providing for the support of 
illegitimate children by their parents. Really the first family re-
sponsibility law, this statute recited that its purpose was to reduce 
the cost of poor relief to the parishes.10 In view of this legislative 
background, the inference seems to be that Parliament also had 
the reduction of relief costs in mind when it passed the family 
responsibility laws of 1597 and 1601. This conclusion is borne 
out by noting one significant change in the latter statute. While 
it first applied only to parents and children,11 in 1601 it was ex-
tended to additional collateral relatives. 
The problem of statutory interpretation is further complicated 
by the fact that the common law support duties in England were 
limited to that of a husband to his wife. For this reason, the pri-
mary or coordinate purpose of the 1597 statutes may have been to 
provide a legal remedy where none existed before, with perhaps 
secondary consideration to the problem of relief costs. In any 
9 See Riesenfeld, "The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law," 43 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 175 at 199 (1955). It is of interest that both poor relief and family responsibility 
were established by law in Iceland by the fourteenth century. FREEDOM AND WELFARE, 
Nelson ed., 446 at 456 (1953). 
10 The statute recited that, " •.. the said bastards [are] being now left to be kept 
as the charges of the parish where they be born, to the great burden of the same parish, 
and in defrauding of the relief of the impotent and aged true poor of the same par-
ish ••. .'' 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (1575). 
11 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (1597). 
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event, the courts, without going into the problems of historical 
evidence, have adopted the position that the English law was 
enacted with the aim of reducing the cost of public reliefl- 2 and 
have not given consideration to other possible motivations. 
This assumption regarding the origins of family responsibility 
laws is not specific enough to afford guidance in the resolution 
of the many problems of interpretation that will arise. For ex-
ample, it does not indicate whether the family responsibility law 
was intended to be primary or secondary to public responsibility. 
However, the importance even of this assumption first becomes 
apparent when the question of the constitutionality of family re-
sponsibility laws is examined. The courts have had to consider 
the argument that these laws are unconstitutional on the ground 
that they merely authorize the transfer of money from one in-
dividual to another. Relying on the antiquity of the statute and 
on the existence of at least a moral obligation to provide support 
at common law, the courts have upheld family responsibility as a 
proper exercise of the police power to protect the public purse.13 
12 E.g., People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 
Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 773 (1941). 
3.3 People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Stark v. Fagan, 89 N.J.L. 29, 97 A. 
778 (1916), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Stark v. Jersey City, 90 N.J.L. 187, 100 A. 
340 (1917). See also Atkins v. Curtis, 259 Ala. 311, 66 S. (2d) 455 (1953), holding consti-
tutional the family responsibility provisions in Alabama's categorical assistance statute. 
The Alabama court took the question-begging position that the statute merely fixes a 
liability which private persons then enforce against other private persons. For an analysis 
of the transfer of property argument as used to oppose the exercise of the eminent domain 
power see Mandelker, "Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment," 28 TULANE L. REV. 96 
(1953). 
The argument, that the family responsibility statute unreasonably classifies the per-
sons to whom it applies, e.g., because it excuses relatives without means, has also been 
rejected by the courts. See the cases cited and Wood v. Wheat, 226 Ky. 762, 11 S.W. (2d) 
916 (1928). While a New Jersey court has indicated that a statute which extended to 
sisters and brothers would be unconstitutional, In re Roger's Estate, 96 N.J. Eq. 6, 125 
A. 318 (1924), the statute held constitutional in the Illinois case cited above so provided 
and the case involved an action by a sister to compel support from her brother. In Polk 
County v. Owen, 187 Iowa 220, 174 N.W. 99 (1919), the Iowa court reserved judgment 
on the constitutional question. 
While the cases holding the statute constitutional relied in part on the existence of 
the moral duty at common law, it sho,µld be pointed out that the creation of a new duty 
not even existing at common law would not be unconstitutional provided the statute 
otherwise meets the test of substantive due process. See LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAw §5.20 (1952) (citing cases holding workmen's compensation statutes constitu-
tional). Another approach to the problem would be to view the family responsibility 
law as an exaction in the nature of a tax, levied uniformly on all who come within the 
enumerated classes. 
Some states have constitutional provisions providing for the support of "indigents'' 
or of "paupers." The Alabama court indicated that the presence of such a provision in 
its constitution did not invalidate the family responsibility law, which could be upheld 
simply as a definition of the word "pauper.'' 
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B. A Social Policy Toward Family Responsibility 
Whatever the original reasons for adopting the family re-
sponsibility provision, it would seem important to make a con-
temporary evaluation of general assistance and family responsi-
bility. Unfortunately, the evidence as to the uses and effects of 
family responsibility laws, upon which such an evaluation must 
be based, is not satisfactory. What evidence there is regarding 
their use indicates that, while court actions under the statute may 
be infrequent, agencies do their best to enforce the support duties 
through administrative action.14 How fairly or efficiently the 
statute has worked out in practice, however, is not clear.15 While 
it has often been stated that those charged with administering 
public assistance are opposed to family responsibility, one recent 
survey reports to the contrary,16 so that'there appears to be no 
clearcut opinion of the program on the part of those who ad-
minister it. Another survey, made in Illinois, did find that court 
orders for support were often ignored and that the law has fallen 
into disuse in some areas. Whether the administration of the law 
resulted in increased or decreased costs for the public was a ques-
tion.17 
The enforcement of family responsibility may well work a 
· hardship on the relatives· called on for support. Compelling an 
unmarried adult child to support aging parents may keep him 
in the parental home and prevent him from establishing a home 
14 See the following comment in GENriLE AND How ARD, GENERAL AssISTANCE 7 (1949), 
summarizing the results_ of a recent survey of general assistance practices. "Although few 
agencies used the courts to compel a legally responsible relative to support a client, aid 
was sometimes denied when the relative was unwilling, though able, to do so." The 
authors also comment that every effort was made to secure contributions. 
15 New Mexico has no family responsibility law relating to indigents, although in that 
state a father is resp·onsible for pie care of his minor child irrespective of need. A survey 
in one county in that state indicated that the officials did not insist on the father meeting 
this responsibility, and contacted only those relatives believed to be interested or concerned 
in the applicant's welfare. PINO, PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW MEXICO 25 (unpublished manu• 
script of thesis, N.Y. School of Social Work, Columbia University 1948). 
16 See THE TAX FOUNDATION, IMPROVING PUBLIC AssISTANCE 31 (1953). It is of interest 
that a recent survey of public opinion in Illinois revealed overwhelming public support 
for the retention of the family responsibility provision. A Proposed Public Assistance 
Code of Illinois 122, 123 (Report of the Illinois Public Assistance Laws Commission 1947). 
17 ABBOIT, PUBLIC AssISTANCE: AMERICAN P~CIPLES AND POLICIES 155 et seq. (1940). 
The survey, which was made in the 1930's, indicated that the law was enforced primarily 
in urban communities. Significantly, the relationship between the burden of support and 
the cost of litigation was noted by the court in Howard Co. v. Enevoldsen, 118 Neb. 222, 
224: N.W. 280 (1929). See also the comments in Von Otterstedt, "Reciprocal Support 
Legislation," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 164 (1952) (University of Michigan 
Law School Legislative Research Center). 
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of his own.18 If the relative is married and has a family of his own, 
the burden of support may materially affect his own standard of 
living.19 Some of the responsible relatives may be outside the state 
and thus not as easily held to account as relatives who have re-
mained in the state.20 Although the available evidence is far from 
adequate, the facts seem to indicate that family responsibility does 
not always work efficiently. Whether it is a desirable part of the 
assistance program will depend, however, on the standards by 
which such data is evaluated. New administrative devices, for ex-
ample, might remedy existing enforcement problems. 
Before discussing policy, it should be pointed out that the fam-
ily responsibility laws are not used, as a matter of practice, to en-
force the support duties recognized at common law. These com-
mon law duties exist between members of a family who constitute 
an interdependent unit, ordinarily living under one roof. Instead, 
the family responsibility laws appear to be used primarily to enforce 
the duty of an adult child to support his dependent parents, or to 
secure the support of one collateral relative by another.21 These 
support obligations, therefore, involve independent families, or in-
dependent members of a family. A typical case might be that of 
a parent who makes a claim on a grown son, the latter having es-
tablished a family and home of his own. The writer is not ready 
to challenge the proposition that society must enforce the support 
obligation of members of an immediate, interdependent family, 
e.g., of the husband to the wife. Critical examination will be made 
here of the extension of this support duty beyond this group, by 
means of the family responsibility laws, to members of a family 
who are independent of the person seeking support. 
18 Persons over 65 may be covered by Old Age Assistance, to which the same or sepa• 
rate family responsibility statutes may be applicable. However, persons near but under 
65 may, although not disabled, have difficulty in finding employment. These people 
would then have to depend on general assistance or, in the alternative, on support by 
relatives. 
19 ABBO'IT, PUBLIC Ass1srANCE: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 164 (1940); Bigge, 
"Looking Ahead in Public Assistance," 7 SOCIAL SEC. BUL. 4 (1944). For similar comments 
with reference to the enforcement of relative responsibility in Old Age Assistance pro-
grams, see Griffin, "The Standard Budget and Children's Responsibility in the Massa• 
chusetts Old Age Assistance Program," 18 SocIAL SER.v. R.Ev. 333 (1944); Hitrovo, "Re-
sponsibility of Relatives in the Old Age Assistance Program in Pennsylvania," 18 SoCIAL 
SERV. R.Ev. 67 (1944). The latter article reviews a statute which is also applicable to 
general assistance. 
20 Out-of-state responsible relatives may now be reached in most jurisdictions through 
the procedures authorized by reciprocal enforcement of support legislation, but this is 
cumbersome as compared with the remedies available to reach in-state relatives. No doubt 
the latter will be contacted first. See the discussion in the continuation of this article. 
21 AllBOIT, PUBLIC AssisrANCE: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 154-193 (1940). 
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There is a widespread agreement on the necessity of preserving 
"the family,"22 and both the proponents and opponents of family 
responsibility start with this assumption.23 The question is whether 
family relationships are in fact strengthened by insistence on the 
support obligation in the general assistance setting. This in turn 
will depend on how one evaluates a support demand made on a 
relative on the basis of economic need. It could be contended that 
a refusal to meet such a demand is immoral, being motivated by a 
desire to avoid one's responsibilities by casting them on the public. 
However, the demand for support may raise serious emotional 
problems for the person called upon because it symbolizes to him 
the personal inadequacy of the needy individual. This point may 
be illustrated by the parent's demand on his adult child for sup-
port. The child's reaction will depend upon his past relationship 
with his family. If the child has not developed his own sense of 
security and has a need for acceptance by the family group, he may 
well be overgenerous. But the child who has separated himself 
from his family with difficulty will resent the financial and per-
sonal ties that the statute compels and will exaggerate the reasons 
why he cannot afford to give.24 Indeed, in any family relationship 
characterized by tension, the relative called on for support may 
deny the call for help in order to punish the relative who makes 
the demand. 
Emotional difficulties on the other side of the support relation• 
ship should also be considered. A parent who must accept support 
from the child may find the receipt of aid damaging to his self-
respect. 25 The tension which is engendered if the relative is forced 
to furnish support, or which naturally results in any situation 
where one person is financially dependent on another,26 certainly 
is not conducive to a satisfactory adjustment of the dependent in-
dividual to his new status. 
22 See, in this connection, the following declaration of policy in the Illinois public 
assistance code, Ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §436-1: "The maintenance of the family 
unit shall be a principal consideration in the administration of this Code, and all public 
assistance policies shall be formulated and administered with the purpose of strengthen-
ing the family unit." 
23 See the comments in A PROPOSED PUBLIC AssISTANCE CODE OF ll.LINOIS 125 (1947) 
(Report of the Illinois Public Assistance Laws Commission). 
24 This approach to family responsibility was suggested in TowLE, CoMMON HUMAN 
NEEDS 83 (1952). 
25 The comments in Griffin, "The Standard Budget and Children's Responsibility in 
the Massachusetts Old Age Assistance Program,'' 18 SocIAL SERv. REv. 333 (1944), are 
applicable to this situation. See also MERIAM, RELIEF AND SOCIAL SECURITY 589 (1946); 
Heavin, "Recipients and/or Versus Responsible Relatives,'' 55 PUBLIC WELFARE IN INDIANA, 
No. 5, p. 9 (May 1945). 
26 See the analysis in PEYSER, THE STRONG AND THE WEAK 8-10 (1951). 
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Financial difficulties encountered by the relative who is forced 
to give support may well compound the emotional problems. To 
enable the relative to meet the statutory obligation, for example, 
a mother-in-law may be forced to live in her son-in-law's home. 
Personal and financial stresses and strains in the home of the rel-
ative called on for support may then lead to feelings of insecurity 
on the part of the members of that family. Or an adolescent may be 
frustrated in his need to establish himself on his own if he is forced 
to remain in his home in order to support his parents. Some writ-
ers27 and judges28 have remarked that family responsibility litiga-
tion is merely a symptom and not the cause of the impairment of 
family integrity. 
If general assistance is to be evaluated in terms of its effects on 
family relationships, it would seem possible to draw some rather 
adverse conclusions about the present operation of the family re-
sponsibility laws. It might be argued that the law should not com-
pel responsible relatives to support dependent persons who are 
in need-that where the family relationship is good the support 
will be forthcoming. Where it is not, to compel support will 
merely aggravate an already difficult situation with results that 
are ultimately more harmful than helpful to the family structure.29 
Whether society is ready to take a step which will relieve relatives 
entirely of the support of dependents, and place it wholly on ~he 
public, is another question. In view of the increasing urbanization 
of the United States, and the disappearance of the large family 
homestead in which three generations could comfortably live under 
one roof, it may well be that this step will have to be taken. 
This writer, however, sees no objection to the retention of the 
family responsibility laws, provided that some revisions in the 
statutory framework are made. In the remaining portion of this 
27 .AllBOTr, PUBLIC AssISTANCE: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 168 (1940); BISNO, 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL WORK 43 (1952); GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE 
COURTS OF NEW YoRK CITY 178, 179 (1954); TOWLE, COMMON HUMAN NEEDS 82 (1952). 
2BE.g., Sicher, J., in Neuerstein v. Newburger, 55 N.Y.S. (2d) 906 at 908 (1945); 
Panken, J., in Hommel v. Hommel, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 977 at 979 (1940). 
29 See the comment o_f Crane, J., in Field v. Field, 79 Misc. 557, 139 N.Y.S. 673 at 
673 (1913) (divorce case): "Society and the home [are] preserved, not by law, but by an 
instinctive as well as educated regard for tlie moral rights of others." The writer would 
agree with the qualification that fulfillment of the support obligation is dependent upon 
the maintenance of healthy family relationships, which will in tum prevent family break-
downs. See also University of Connecticut School of Social Work, Statement of Relative 
Responsibility (April I, 1951). Because of the family tensions that are present in a case 
in which support is compelled, it would appear that any person forced into payment 
may ultimately default, or could be kept current only at continued and expensive public 
vigilance. 
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article, the present law of family responsibility will be surveyed 
with reference to the principal problems presented by the statutes, 
and changes in the existing laws will be suggested. 
IL PERSONS COVERED BY FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
A. Relationship to Common Law Duties 
Most of the family responsibility statutes are presently limited 
to the reciprocal liabilities of one spouse to another, and to the 
parent-child relationship. However, something over one-third of 
these statutes also extend the support duty to grandparents and, 
in some instances, to grandchildren also. There are a few statutes 
which extend the duty, in addition, to brothers and sisters.30 The 
statutes do not seem to preclude reliance by the locality extending 
aid on the support duties which existed at common law,31 and, 
presumably, on any other statutes authorizing civil actions for sup-
port. At th~ same time the family responsibility statutes have been 
limited to the specific relatives named and have not been extended 
along the lines of ascent or descent.32 
It might be expected that the common law status of infants 
(minors) and married women would qualify the support duties 
existing under the family responsibility statutes. With reference 
30 For a tabulation of the relatives held responsible under the various general assist-
ance and family responsibility statutes, as of July 1, 1951, see PUBLIC AssrsrANCE PoLICIES 
AMONG TIIE STATES Table 41 (47 Minnesota Legislative Research Committee 1951). Some 
of the statutes, in addition to providing for an action against living relatives, also provide 
for the support of the dependent person from the relative's estate. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 
(1949) §2611 (support of spouse); Okla. Stat. Ann. (1951) tit. 10, §11 (support of parent); 
S.D. Code (1939) §14.0315 (same). Cf. Rawlings v. Goldfrap, 5 Ves. Jr. 440, 31 Eng. Rep. 
671 (1800). 
31 E.g., Sturbridge v. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 35 N.E. 669 (1893); Hanover v. Turner, 
14 Mass. 227 (1817); Brown Co. v. Siebert, 175 Minn. 39, 220 N.W. 156 (1926); Chester 
v. Underhill, 16 N.H. 64 (1844); Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N.H. 571 (1835); Goodale v. Law-
rence, 88 N.Y. 513 (1882); Howard v. Whetstone Tp., IO Ohio 365 (1841). In all of these 
cases the locality recovered against the husband for relief given to his wife. Where the 
common law duty of the husband is relied on, he may not take advantage of any defenses 
available under the family responsibility statute. In re Aspenleiter's Estate, 203 Misc. 109, 
114 N.Y.S. (2d) 486 (1952). To the effect that the parent's duty ·of support under the 
statute continues even after a divorce, see Marconi v. Delviso, 117 N.Y.S. (2d) 412 (1952), 
For a discussion of a similar problem arising with reference to the duty of a parent to 
support his minor child see PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., § 127 (1930). 
32 See, e.g., Sharum v. Sharum, 101 Okla. "273, 225 P. 682 (1924). A grandson sued his 
grandfather for support, although the local statute applied only to parents and children. 
He claimed that, since the grandfather was liable under the statute to support his son, 
he had what might be called a derivative duty to support any children dependent on his 
son. This contention was rejected by the court, which pointed out that if the duty to 
support were so construed it could be continued ad infinitum. The statute is limited, 
therefore, to the persons it names. In re Roger's Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 6, 125.A. 318 (1924) 
(brothers and sisters not covered unless expressly included). 
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to the infant, the obligation of support is one that may also be 
assumed by contract. Because at common law the infant could 
disaffirm his contracts, it might be expected that the duty to sup-
port under the family responsibility statute would not be applied 
to him. Yet, the common law support duties were also imposed 
upon the infant, as he was held liable for necessaries purchased to 
support his wife and minor children.33 For this reason, the in-
fant might be held subject to the duties imposed by the family 
responsibility statute. The purpose of giving the infant the priv-
ilege to disaffirm contracts was to protect him from imposition. 
Where a duty is placed upon him by statute, however, no such 
opportunity is present. For all or some of these reasons, courts 
have held that, under the statute, infants have the duty to support 
their parents.34 
Because the minor child has the riglit to be supported under 
the common law or other statutes, it could be argued that the 
family responsibility statute creates no right to support in his 
favor. Yet, because the purpose of the family responsibility stat-
utes is to reduce relief costs, they may be found to provide a 
complementary remedy. In one case which discussed this prob-
lem the court took the view that the statute "refers only to their 
poor adult cq.ildren.''35 Some of the statutes apply specifically to the 
support of adult children.36 
With reference to the support duty of the wife, and other female 
members of the family unit, the intent of the first English statute 
to change the common law, and its specific reference to the mother 
and grandmother of the person claiming support, would indicate 
that the duty to provide support is imposed upon female relatives. 
The cases which have considered this problem have dealt solely 
with the duty of a married woman to provide support. Relying 
on the disabilities of a married woman under common law, and 
the merger of her legal existence with that of her husband, they 
have held that a married woman, as distinguished from a mother 
33 PECK, DOMF.STIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §§4, 5 (1930). 
34 Bradley v. Fenn, 103 Conn. 1, 130 A. 126 (1925); Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 686, 
200 S. 4 (1941) (support duty under the civil code): Chesterfield v. Hart, Smith (N.H.) 
350 (1814). Cf. Tobin v. Bruce, 39 S.D. 64, 162 N.W. 933 (1917), cert. den. 245 U.S. 18, 
38 S.Ct. 7 (1917) (dictum). 
35 Haakon County v. Staley, 60 S.D. 87 at 89, 243 N.W. 671 (1932). In most cases the 
duty to provide support to minors seems to be assumed. E.g., Tulin v. Tulin, 124 Conn. 
518,200 A. 819 (1938); Howard County v. Enevoldsen, 118 Neb. 222, 224 N.W. 280 (1929); 
Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123, 166 A. 570 (1933) (dictum). 
36 See, e.g., N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act §101 (4) (Supp. 1955), authorizing 
the support of "dependent person[s] over seventeen years of age." 
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or grandmother not under coverture, is not liable to furnish sup-
port under the statute.37 Whether these holdings would be altered 
by statutory changes in the married woman's position is open to 
conjecture.38 Some of the American statutes have been made ex-
pressly applicable to wives, sisters, grandmothers, and other female 
members of the family.30 
The best solution to this problem would seem to be statutory 
revision which would remove all persons entitled to support at 
common law from the ambit of the family responsibility laws. 
There seems to be no reason why family responsibility statutes 
should also cover the obligations of support, existing among the 
members of the immediate interdependent family living together 
as a unit, which were generally recognized at common law. These 
can be adequately covered under other statutes, which impose the 
duty of support irrespective of the need of the person seeking it.40 
Family responsibility laws ought not to extend the liability for 
support to collateral or distant relatives, such as brothers, sisters, 
and grandparents, where the family relationship is more tenuous 
and where the difficulties of compelling support are likely to 
multiply. These changes should result ip the retention, principal-
ly, of the reciprocal duties of support existing between parents and 
adult male children. However, assuming they ha\'.e the ability 
to provide it, there should be no objection to making minors and 
female members of the family liable for the support of related 
dependent persons. 
37 Gleason v. Boston, 144 Mass. 25, IO N.E. 476 (1887) (wife not liable for support 
of minor children); Coleman v. Birmingham, 6 Q.B. 615 (1881). See also Glowsky v. 
Gitlin, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 957 (1941), refusing on grounds of "natural justice" t~extend the 
New York statutes imposing the support duty on stepparents to stepmothers. But cf. 
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 58 Montg. (Pa.) 155 (1941), and the statutes cited in note 53, 
infra. A Massachusetts statute now requires both parents to support their minor chil-
dren. Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 201, §40. The legal capacity of a married woman at 
common law is discussed in PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §82 et seq. (1930). 
38 On the other hand, one New York case held that the support duty was owing to 
female as well as male dependent persons, and while the case involved a dependent 
daughter, its language is broad enough to include married women. Frankel v. Goldstein, 
155 Misc. 531, 280 N.Y.S. 191 (1935). This result has been assumed in other cases arising 
under this statute. Cf. Ex parte Hunt, 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 284 (1826) (grandson held liable 
to support his maternal grandparents). 
39 See, e.g., Kinsey v. Kinsey, 200 Misc. 760, 107 N.Y.S. (2d) 212 (1951), applying the 
New York City law expressly extending the duty of support to the wife; Okla. Stat. Ann. 
(1951) tit. 10, §12 (1951) (mother); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1972 (masculine 
pronoun to include feminine); Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, §2 (reciprocal duty between 
husband and wife). 
40 It might be argued that the common law is deficient in that it does not usually 
allow a minor child to sue his parent for support. This deficiency could be remedied by 
a statute directed to this problem. 
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B. Nature of Family Relationships Covered 
Most of the family responsibility statutes list the relatives who 
are responsible for support but usually indicate the individuals 
entitled to support only as "dependent" or "poor" persons. By 
inference, of course, the person entitled to support is defined 
by listing the persons who must give it. For example, if a parent 
is liable to provide support then his child may claim support 
from him. Still, the statutes generally leave open the question 
of what is needed to create the particular relationship in question, 
whether, for example, it must be a natural relationship, or whether 
it can be one created by law, as in the case of an individual who 
becomes a child by adoption. 
As a rule, it may be said that courts decide these cases by 
making reference to the legal status of the individuals involved, 
as determined in other contexts. This approach often ignores the 
real nature of the particular relationship in question. It might 
be helpful to start instead with the postulate that it is preferable 
to impose the duties and rights of support in those family situa-
tions which are voluntarily assumed and not in situations where 
the family relationship has been discontinued. For example, it 
seems best to hold an adoptive father liable to support his adopted 
child, since this legal relationship was assumed voluntarily by 
the adoptive father. On the other hand, it would not seem desir-
able to hold the natural father liable for the child's support in 
these cases, since he has voluntarily relinquished the family rela-
tionship. Such an approach recognizes the basic assumptions made 
earlier-that family strength depends on mutually satisfactory re-
lationships; this would seem to be lacking where there is in fact 
no real family tie. In cases where the family tie has been relin-
quished, furthermore, as in the adoptive situation, it is usually 
considered preferable to center the child's relationship in the new 
family to the exclusion of the old,41 and the law ought to further 
this objective. · 
The first group of cases that might be considered are those in 
which there is an absence of a natural relationship between the 
parties involved. The discussion might start with the adoptive 
situation where, presumedly, the affectional ties are the closest, and 
proceed to a consideration of other relationships where they are 
less strong. 
41 Caseworkers in adoption agencies have indicated that this is standard casework 
practice. Cf. Martire and McCandless, "Psychological Aspects of the Adoption Process," 
40 IOWA L. R.Ev. 350 (1955). 
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In the few cases found which were concerned with the support 
rights and duties of adopted children, no unanimity among the 
decisions was discovered. The cases are split as to whether there 
is a duty on the part of the adoptive child to support his adoptive 
parent,42 but the New York Court of Appeals did hold that a 
natural parent is not bound to support his natural child under 
the family responsibility law after its adoption by another.43 Some 
of these cases rely on the effect of the adoption statutes, which 
usually declare that, after the adoption, the child becomes the child 
of the adoptive parents.44 On this basis they find that the natural 
parent has been relieved of the rights and duties of support. In 
some of the cases, however, there is no discussion beyond the 
citation of general construction statutes45 and decisions indicating, 
in other contexts, how the word child is to be defined. 
Any one case, of course, does not deal with both sides of the 
support obligation, although it should seem clear that if the adop-
tive child has the duty to support his adoptive parent, he also has 
the right to expect support from him. In other words, the duty 
should be reciprocal.46 To the extent that these decisions shift 
reciprocal duties of support to the adoptive relationship, they 
would seem to reach a desirable result. 
Another situation where the relationship is an assumed and 
not a natural one is that between the stepparent and the step-
child. Since the decision to assume the duties of parenthood in 
this case is indirect rather than direct, arising out of the decision 
to marry the parent of the child rather than a decision to accept 
the child itself, the affectional ties between the stepparent and, 
stepchild could be expected to be lacking or present in a lesser 
degree than in the case of a natural child. Because of the rule, 
under the English law, that the statute extended only to natural 
relationships, 47 the American courts have assumed that a step-
parent is under no duty to support his stepchild under the family 
42 That there is a duty to support, see Couteau v. Couteau, 192 Misc. 736, 77 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 113 (1948); Commonwealth v. Chiara, 60 Pa. D. & C. 547 (1947). Contra, Parshall v. 
Parshall, 56 Cal. App. 553, 205 P. 1083 (1922). 
43 Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E. (2d) 548 (1937). But cf. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 
Ill. 630, 10 N.E. (2d) 344 (1937) (divorce, court may enter support order against natural 
parent), noted in 16 Cru•KENT L. R.Ev. 198 (1938); 36 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1028 (1938). 
44E.g., N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §115. 
45 A statute defining a child as an adopted child for all purposes under the statutes 
may well be decisive of this question. See, e.g., S.D. Code (1939) §65.0201 (3). 
46 This appears to be the basis for the decision in Couteau v. Couteau, 192 Misc. 736, 
77 N.Y.S. (2d) 113 (1948). 
47 Rex v. Mundon, I Str. 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1719). 
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responsibility laws.48 The decisions in these cases do not seem 
desirable, as they do not reinforce the voluntarily formed family 
unit. Should one or more members of the family require support, 
a division of the support duty within the family would seem to 
have a harmful rather than an ameliorative effect.49 Statutes in 
two states have extended the duty of support of needy relatives to 
the stepparents.Crn 
Because of the rule given above, that the statute does not 
extend to relatives by affinity, the courts have also held that a 
person in need may not secure support from his in-laws.51 Here 
the courts seem on sounder ground, since the in-law sought to be 
held has himself done nothing to establish an affective relationship 
with the person seeking aid. The mother-in-law, for example, is 
not a party to the marriage of her daughter. 
One situation in which this rule may bring about an inequit-
able result, however, is that in which a parent seeks support from 
his married daughter. Following the usual rule as to in-laws, the 
courts generally do not compel the son-in-law to support his 
mother-in-law or father-in-law.52 In addition, even if the daughter 
has money or property of her own, she may be excused from the 
support duty if the rule as to married women is applied. While 
excusing the son-in-law from the duty of support may be defended 
48 See Bradley v. Zimmerman, 13 N.J. Misc. 580, 180 A. 241 (1935) (dictum); Man-
chester v. Rupert, 6 Vt. 291 (1834) (dictum). In St. Johnsbury v. Sutton, 102 Vt. 451, 150 
A. 133 (1930), the Vermont court, following the Manchester case, held that a statute 
making a town responsible for the support of a poor person and his "family" did not 
obligate the town to support the children by a wife's former husband. The same result 
bas been reached regarding the duty of a stepparent to support bis minor stepchildren, 
even though they are not in need. PECK, DOMESTIC RELA'rloNs, 3d ed., 247 (1930). And 
cf. Brookfield v. Warren, 128 Mass. 287 (1880). 
49 See the comments of Panken, J., in D. G. v. Hermanez, 204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 234 (1953). 
50 A statute in New Hampshire provides that stepmothers and stepfathers shall sup-
port stepchildren when in need. N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18. Statutes in New 
York provide that the stepparent shall support minor stepchildren in need. N.Y. Social 
Welfare Law (Supp. 1955) §101 (I); N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act §101 (5). For 
a decision applying the statewide statute see People v. Williams, 161 Misc. 573, 292 N.Y.S. 
458 (1936). The New York City act is limited to stepparents who "had knowledge of the 
child's existence" at the time of the marriage. For a decision applying that statute see 
Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N.Y.S. 221 (1937). For a full discussion of the stepparent 
relationship see MERIAM, THE STEPFATIIER IN THE FAMILY (1940). See the case of D. G. v. 
Hermanez, 204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1953), for a discussion of inequities arising 
under the New York City provision. 
51 E.g., Newtown v. Danbury, 3 Conn. 553 (1821); Mack v. Parsons, Kirby Conn. 155 
(1785); Doyle's Petition, 38 Pa. D. &: C. 476 (1940); Commissioners v. Gansett, 2 Bailey 
(S.C.) 320 (1831). Cf. Barnet v. Norton, 90 Vt. 544, 99 A. 238 (1916). 
·52 Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 301, 108 P. (2d) 701 (1941); Mangin v. 
Mangin, 164 La. 326, 113 S. 864 (1927); Alessandro v. Camelli, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 237 (1944); 
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 19 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. (Pa.) 465 (1917). 
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on the grounds stated above, the cumulative effect of the rules 
applicable in this situation will be to shift the duty to support 
parents entirely to the sons and unmarried daughters, which does 
not seem just. 
This result does not seem inevitable, however. To apply the 
rule excusing married women from the support duty under the 
statute in a case where the husband does not have a duty to sup-
port the dependent seeking aid seems to subvert the intent of the 
family responsibility law. Furthermore, even if the daughter does 
not have independent means, it might be well to recognize that, 
in many American homes, she shares in the management and 
disposition of the family assets and therefore has a "right," prac-
tically speaking, to her share in her husband's earnings. There is 
judicial support for both of these propositions.53 
An even more difficult problem to cope with is the position of 
the illegitimate child under the statute. Here, though the parent-
child relationship is a natural one, it is complicated by the fact that 
society does not sanction illegitimate births, and the fact that 
the child, from the start, is not part of a family unit. Where the 
illegitimate child has been placed for adoption he ought to be 
given the same status as any adopted child. If the illegitimate 
child has not been adopted, however, the question remains as to 
the liability of his natural parents for his support under the family 
responsibility laws. Most courts which have passed on the question 
have held that an illegitimate child is not entitled to support from 
53 Cf. Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 470 (1950) (dictum, married 
daughter not -chargeable except out of her personal earnings or individual property). See 
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1950) §68-102: " .•• married females, while they live with their husbands, 
shall not be liable to a suit for maintenance beyond the interest or income of the estate 
of such married female held in her own right." See also Utah Code Ann. (1953) §17-14-2 
(similar provision). But cf. Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §2 (married women not liable 
to suit). 
In Commonwealth v. Moyer, 58 Montg. (Pa.) 155 (1941), where the married daughter 
had no independent means, the court entered a support award against her nonetheless, 
stating that the husband, apparently a man of means, ought to give his wife enough 
money to support her father. Perhaps the smallness of the award ($1'.00 per week) was 
a factor. The court, however, denied that it was making a son-in-law legally liable to 
support his father-in-law. See, however, Kullman v. Wyrtzen, 266 App. Div. 802, 41 
N.Y.S. (2d) 682 (1943). A mother claimed that her daughter was of sufficient ability to 
support her on the ground that she was the owner of real property as tenant by the 
entirety with her husband, and that therefore he should account to her for one-half of 
its rental value. The court found for the daughter on the property rule that one co-
tenant need not account to the other unless he occupies the property exclusively. If a 
basis be sought for the Pennsylvania decision it might be found in the common law duty 
of a husband to support his wife. A father being entitled to support from his natural 
child, it could be held that he was subrogated to his share of what the daughter was 
entitled to receiv~ by way of support from her husband. 
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responsible relatives named in the statute,54 nor is he, on the other 
hand, liable to support dependent relatives seeking aid from him.55 
Various grounds are relied on for this holding, particularly 
the rule regarding the status of the illegitimate under the early 
common law, which treated him as nullius fillius, nobody's child, 
and therefore legally without blood relatives. Pointing to statutes 
in a few states removing entirely the disability of illegitimacy, 
the court may also note the absence of such a provision in the local 
statutes to sustain its holding. However, the illegitimate's position 
is not quite the same as it was at common law, most states having 
passed, in addition to support statutes based on the poor law pro-
vision of 1575, statutes enabling the illegitimate to inherit, at 
least through the maternal line.56 These legislative changes may 
be viewed in various ways. 
The courts holding that the illegitimate is not covered by the 
family responsibility law cite the presence of such statutes as an 
indication that the legislature intended nothing further. Some of 
the courts in Pennsylvania, however, have relied on the presence of 
a statute authorizing illegitimates to inherit through the maternal 
line as an indication of legislative intent that there are reciprocal 
support duties between the illegitimate child and the maternal 
side of his parentage.57 One New York trial court judge has relied 
on these statutory modifications to extend the provisions of the 
family support statute to the illegitimate without qualification.58 
The continued application of ancient common law concepts 
to this problem seems unfortunate. After all, the parent of an 
illegitimate child could have chosen to place him out for adop-
tion.59 As to the parent who has kept the child and with whom the 
54 Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367 (1858); Plymouth v. Hey, 285 Mass. 357, 189 N.E. 100 
(1934); Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N.H. 86 (1827); Anon. v. Anon., 174 Misc. 906, 22 
N.Y.S. (2d) 598 (1940); Commonwealth v. Clayton, 42 Pa. D. &: C. 317 (1941); Common-
wealth v. Campagna, 40 Pa. D. &: C. 478 (1940); Directors of the Poor v. Hickman, 4 Pa. 
Dist. 494 (1895). 
65 Castellani v. Castellani, 176 Misc. 763, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 879 (1941), affd. per curiam 
sub nom. Capaldo v. Capaldo, 263 App. Div. 984, 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 400 (1942), motion for 
appeal den. 264 App. Div. 755, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 267 (1942). 
56 See 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §249 (1936); Robbins and Deak, "The 
Familial Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study," 30 CoL. L. R.Ev. 308 
(1930). For an outline of laws providing for the support of illegitimates, see Legislation, 
6 BAYLOR L. R.Ev. 520 (1954). 
57 See, e.g., In re McAllister, 31 Pa. D. &: C. 4 (1936). 
58 Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660,292 N.Y.S. 221 (1937); Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43,.291 
N.Y.S. 47 (1936), noted, 46 YALE L.J. 875 (1937). Cf. Craig v. Shea, 102 Neb. 575, 168 N.W. 
133 (1918) (semble). 
59 None of the cases involving illegitimates under the family responsibility laws appear 
to involve children adopted into other homes. 
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child is living, there seems to be no reason for not imposing the 
support duty. While the putative father, the parent with whom 
the child usually does not stay, will ordinarily resent the imposi-
tion of a support obligation on him, perhaps he ought not to be 
allowed to escape the consequences of his own actions in this 
particular context. 
Still, the presence in most jurisdictions of statutory remedies 
specifically aimed at providing for the support of illegitimates 
raises real problems of legislative intent. In the absence of legisla-
tive histories in most jurisdictions, a court can only speculate on an 
answer to this problem. Under the circumstances, perhaps it might 
be best to indicate specifically in the family responsibility law 
whether it is to apply to illegitimates. A few states have so ex-
tended their statutes.60 Another approach might be to recognize 
the status of the illegitimate as unique, in view of the family 
problems this situation gives rise to, and exempt both natural 
parents from the support duty for this reason. 
In any event statutory clarifications, with consideration of the 
problems that are involved, might be advisable for all of the 
situations discussed in this section. A well-drafted definition of 
the persons covered by the family responsibility law, particularly 
with reference to the parent-child relationship, would clarify legis-
lative intent and save much speculative litigation.61 
III. NATURE OF THE SUPPORT DUTY 
A. The Dependent's Eligibility for Support 
A duty of support will be found to exist under the family 
responsibility laws if there is a dependent person eligible for 
support and a responsible relative who is able to furnish the sup-
port required by the statute. Most of the family responsibility 
statutes provide that the dependent who is eligible for support 
must be a "needy" or "poor" person.62 The test for family re-
sponsibility and the test for public assistance, then, correspond, 
60 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.3; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) art. 241, applied in 
Drouet v. Succession of Drouet, 26 La. Ann. 323 (1874); Collins v. Hallier, 12 La. Ann. 
678 (1856); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §32-3601; S.D. Code (1939) §37.2101. 
61 The Illinois statute extends the duty of support to anybody "in loco parentis" to 
a child. This phrase has not yet been interpreted by the courts. The Rhode Island law 
extends to "children by adoption," and is limited to relatives "by consanguinity." R.I. 
Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §5. See Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97 (relatives "by consanguinity''). 
Cf. N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944, Supp. 1954) §2112 (definition of persons covered 
by support duties stated in reciprocal enforcement law). 
62 Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, §13 (needy person); Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1949) §296 (poor person); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §13:4731 (necessitous circumstances); La. 
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since the individual eligible for public assistance must be one 
who is in need. Some of the statutes expressly provide that the 
eligibility test is the same in both contexts,68 and some courts 
have so held even where this has not been made explicit.64 The 
problem of eligibility, then, becomes one of determining whether 
the dependent is in need of public assistance. This approach 
seems consistent with the logic of including the family responsi-
bility law in a general assistance statute, since presumably the 
persons for whom the responsible relatives are liable are those to 
whom the locality also owes a duty of support. 
The alternative position would be to assume that, because the 
support duty grows out of the family relationship, it attaches in 
circumstances something less compelling than need and destitu-
tion. This rule appears to have been adopted by the Minnesota 
court, which, without detailing the standard to be applied in such 
cases, held that a "poor person" under its family responsibility 
Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) art. 229 (need); Mass. Laws Ann. (1949) c. 117, §6 (poor persons); 
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18 (same); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (a) 
(indigent person); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §5 (poor person); Vt. Laws (1953) No. 
196, §2 (destitute and necessitous circumstances); Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88 (neces-
sitous circumstances); W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (150) (indigent person). The depend-
ent's need must be proved as a matter of fact. An allegation to this effect is not enough. 
Bannock Co. v. Coffin, 46 Idaho 631, 269 P. 90 (1928); Brown v. Van Keuren, 340 m. 118, 
172 N.E. 1 (1930). For a case noting the effect of a change in the need requirement in 
the Pennsylvania law, see Montgomery v. Wick, (Pa. Super. 1941) 22 A. (2d) 95. 
!68 Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1951) §70-605; Cal. Welfare &: Inst. Code (1952) §2576; Ga. 
Code Ann. (1936) §23-2302; Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §§252.1, 252.2; Me. Laws (1953) c. 
308, §97; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.121; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-235; 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1949) §5140; N.Y. Social Welfare Law (Supp. 1955) §101 (l); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.425 (2) (a); S.C. Code (1952) §71-131; Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (1). 
64 Koniak v. Koniak, 123 Conn. 338, 195 A. 189 (1937); Moss v. Moss, 163 Wash. 444, 
1 P. (2d) 916 (1931) (under prior law). See Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton, 171 
Va. 255, 198 S.E. 496 (1938). Under the New York City statute the dependent, in order 
to be entitled to support, must be a person "likely to become a public charge." For cases 
under this statute indicating the necessity of making a calculation of probable future need 
see Hommel v. Hommel, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 977 (1940); Anon. v. Four Anon., 173 Misc. 623, 18 
N.Y.S. (2d) 578 (1940). The statewide provision in the Social Welfare Law is similar. 
Interestingly enough, an identical provision appears in some statutes as the grounds for 
which a nonresident may be compulsorily removed to his place of settlement. Of course, 
a dependent person presently in need of public aid is eligible under the New York statutes. 
Where, by statute or decision, the need of the dependent seeking support from rela-
tives is equated with the need for assistance, the need for aid and not the receipt of aid 
is all that must be proved. Hutchings v. Thompson, 64 Mass. 238 (1852); Walbridge v. 
Walbridge, 46 Vt. 617 (1874). See Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (a) (person 
entitled to support need not be a public charge). A dependent relative does not forfeit 
her claim to support by supporting herself as best she can while the support action is 
pending. Rogers v. Kinnie, 134 Conn. 58, 54 A. (2d) 487 (1947). The court indicated 
that otherwise the statute would cause undue hardship. In Nebraska, although the stat-
utes are somewhat ambiguous, the definition of a dependent relative entitled to family 
support has apparently been adopted as the standard under which eligibility for assistance 
is determined. Miller v. Banner Co., 127 Neb. 690, 256 N.W. 639 (1934). 
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statute does not have to be a person entitled to public support.61s 
These distinctions may not be as important as they might seem 
at first glance. The question of the dependent's eligibility is one 
of fact,66 and the fact-finder will have considerable discretion. 
Still, if the public support need test were adopted, perhaps the 
dependent would be entitled to submit evidence, such as local 
regulations, which would indicate whom the local agency con-
siders to be a needy person. This would help the problem of 
proof in these cases. 
Aside from the question as to the nature of the economic need 
that must be shown by the dependent, however, questions arise 
as to the possible exclusion of individuals from the right to be 
. supported by their families for other reasons. One problem is 
presented by the able-bodied person whose need is created by 
his lack of employment. Statutes defining the persons eligible 
for support, e.g., simply as "poor persons," leave open the question 
of whether the need of the individual must result from mental 
or physical incapacity and not from social conditions causing un-
employment. This limitation may even more plausibly be urged 
under family responsibility statutes extending only to persons 
"unable to maintain themselves by work,"67 or to persons who are 
in need because of some "unavoidable cause."68 
Those few cases which have considered the problem, under 
statutes of the type just described, have indicated that the cause 
of the need for support is not controlling and would imply that 
these statutes are not restricted to persons whose need results from 
incapacity.69 Some family responsibility statutes, however, are 
restricted to persons who are in need because. of incapacity, or 
65 Howie v. Gangloff, 165 Minn. 346, 206 N.W. 441 (1925). A Pennsylvania court has 
given the same interpretation to a criminal statute. It appeared to be aimed, however, 
at enforcing the obligation to support arising out of the family situation rather than 
affording a remedy to reduce the public assistance burden. Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 
38 Pa. D. & C. 217 (1940). . 
66 This seems to be assumed by the cases. See, e.g., Howie v. Gangloff, 165 Minn. 
346, 206 N.W. 441 (1925). In a jury trial, the fact question is for the jury. 
67 This appears to be the substance of statutes in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon (do-
mestic relations law), and South Dakota. · 
68 See the statutes in Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, and Utah. 
69 Under statutes applying, without qualification, to persons in need, it has been 
held that a physically fit person who needs support because he can't find work is, never-
theless, entitled to family support. Hommel v. Hommel, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 977 (1940); Com-
monwealth v. Wright, 28 Del. (Pa.) 522 (1939). The Minnesota statute defines the person 
in need of support as a "poor person who for any reason is unable to earn a livelihood." 
Compare Howie v. Gangloff, 165 Minn. 346, 206 N.W. 441 (1925), where the person 
found to be poor was physically incapacitated, with Brabec v. Boedigheimer, 132 Minn. 
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adopt as a definition of the persons entitled to support the section 
of the statute relating to need for assistance, which so provides.70 
Where the statute does not clearly deal with the problem, it would 
seem preferable to take the more impersonal, objective position, 
that dependency due to incapacity is not required for eligibility. 
More difficult problems are presented, however, by situations 
in which the dependent person has engaged in some. form of active 
misconduct in his relations with those members of the family 
from whom he now seeks support. Some of the cases involve 
parents who have deserted their families and now, having come 
upon hard times, seek support from their children. Another case 
might be that of the child who marries without her mother's con-
sent and then sues her for support. It appears that at common 
law both a wife and a minor child who left the husband and father 
without cause forfeited the right to support.71 Most courts have 
not so construed the family responsibility law and have held that 
the support duty continues in spite of the misconduct of the 
dependent.72 
370, 157 N.W. 508 (1916), where the question was seemingly treated as one of the depend· 
ent's financial inability to support himself. 
The Nebraska statute applies to persons unable to earn a livelihood because of an 
"unavoidable cause." In Howard Co. v. Enevoldsen, 118 Neb. 222, 224 N.W. 280 (1929), 
a divorced mother needed support because she had to stay at home to care for four 
children ranging in age from one to ten. The court found that the care of the children 
was an unavoidable cause which brought about her·need. But d. Monroe Co. v. Abegglen, 
129 Iowa 53, 105 N.W. 350 (1905). Under the Elizabethan law it was held that the depend-
ent had to be unable to work and not merely out of work before he could claim support. 
Rex v. Gully, 10 Mod. 307, 88 Eng. Rep. 740 (1715). 
70 Statutes defining the need for family support as the need for general assistance are 
cited in note 63 supra. In some jurisdictions this results in limiting the duty of family 
support to persons who are needy because they are incapacitated, due to the fact that 
need for general assistance is so defined. See, e.g., the Iowa and South Carolina laws. In 
Mississippi, eligibility for support under the family responsibility law is limited to in-
capacitated persons irrespective of need for general assistance. Miss. Code Ann. (1952) 
§7357. 
Some courts appear to have found a common law duty of a parent to support an 
adult child who is in need because of incapacity. The cases seem to be based upon a 
misapprehension. There was no such duty at common law, and these holdings appear 
to have tacitly converted the statutory duty imposed by the Elizabethan law of 1601 into 
a common law duty. See, e.g., Mt. Pleasant v. Wilcox, 2 Pa. Dist. 628 (1893). 
71 MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 192, 386 (1931). 
72Polk Co. v. Owen, 187 Iowa 220, 174 N.W. 99 (1919); Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 
686, 200 S. 4 (1941) (liability under the Civil Code); Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 192 
Misc. 1014, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 913 (1948); Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 
773 (1941); Hodson v. Holmes, 162 Misc. 226, 294 N.Y.S. 537 (1937); Commonwealth v. 
Auman, 39 Pa. D. & C. 448 (1940). The view adopted in these cases appears to be the 
law in England. Allen v. Coster, 1 Beav. 202, 48 Eng. Rep. 917 (1839). Cf. Bremer Co. 
v. Schroeder, 200 Iowa 1285, 206 N.W. 303 (1925); Jasper Co. v. Osborn, 59 Iowa 208, 13 
N.W. 104 (1882). But d. State v. Jordan, (Conn. 1955) 114 A. (2d) 694 (husband not 
liable for support of wife who ordered him out of the home). 
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These decisions seem to be prompted by the fact that the family 
responsibility law is tied in with the assistance program, and _the 
courts seem to look with disfavor at placing the burden of sup-
port on the public in this instance solely because of the depen-
dent's misconduct. Some New York trial courts, however, have 
excused relatives from supporting persons who have been guilty 
of conduct deviating substantially from the social norm, one judge 
stating that to decree support in such a case would do violence 
"to decent instincts, conscience and justice.''73 
In a few states there is statutory authorization for denying 
family support, except from parent or child, to any person whose 
need has been caused by "intemperance or other bad conduct.''74 
The Minnesota court, in Mower County v. Robertson,15 inter-
preting such a provision, refused to excuse a brother from support-
ing a sister who had, considerably before her application for sup-
port, conceived an illegitimate child, willfully deserted her hus-
band, and, for an inadequate consideration, released a third person 
from a contract to support her. The court felt that the dependent's 
conduct in this case was not causally related to the subsequent 
poverty and that it did not involve the necessary element of moral 
wrongdoing. Perhaps the court intended to limit application of 
this provision of the statute to cases where the dependent had 
committed some morally reprehensible crime which had adversely 
affected his ability to support himself. Another situation which 
might fit the court's definition is that of the irresponsible and 
spendthrift profligate whose dissipations eventually caused him to 
be placed on the public rolls. But one difficulty with tests such as 
73 Houg v. Houg, 159 Misc. 894 at 895, 289 N.Y.S. 27 (1936); In re Garrison, 171 
Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 803 (1939). In the Houg case, for example, the wife, who sought 
support from her husband, had been convicted of prostitution, had contracted a bigamous 
marriage, and had a venereal disease. But cf. Hommel v. Hommel, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 977 
(1940), where the conduct of the father, who drank and was hard to get along with, was 
found not shocking enough to forfeit his right to support. The extreme nature of the 
conduct in some of these cases may distinguish them from other trial court cases in New 
York where support was decreed in spite of the dependent's misconduct. See the cases 
cited in note 72 supra. Cf. McGlothan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 72 F. 
Supp. 176 (dictum; spouse need not support dependent spouse whose conduct gives 
grounds for divorce). 
74 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §1; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.01; Neb. Rev. 
Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §17-14-I. There is a similar provision 
in the Montana statutes providing for a locally-supervised general assistance program. 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-103. These statutes are presently inoperative. The 
Vermont statute excuses each spouse from the reciprocal duty of support for "just cause,'' 
and for "lawful excuse" relieves parents and adult children from the reciprocal duties 
imposed on them. Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, §2. Conceivably, the exceptions might be 
held to cover misconduct of the dependent. 
75 79 M'mn. 357, 82 N.W. 666 (1900). 
1956] FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 519 
"bad conduct" and conduct that shocks "decent instincts" is 
that the standards of good and bad, right and wrong, are subject 
to great variance, and it hardly could be expected that the courts 
would be able to give enough content to such phrases to make them 
helpful guides for administrative judgment. 
A similar exception in other statutes excuses or mitigates the 
duty of the child to support his parents in cases where the child 
has not been supported up to an age at which he can take care 
of himself,76 or has been abandoned and deserted by the parent 
during his minority.77 Inequities could arise· under a statute of this 
type. For example, if the statute requires support until the age of 
twenty-one, a child who leaves the family domicile and embarks 
on his own after graduation from high school would be completely 
excused from support, although there is no wrongdoing on the 
part of the parents. This problem, of course, is obviated if the 
age up to which support must be given is set more realistically. 
Problems also arise under such a law if the support of the 
child by the parent has been interrupted at any time during the 
period of support prescribed by the statute. What if a father 
abandoned his family when a child was five but returned one year 
later and thereafter led an exemplary life? It might be necessary 
for the courts to adopt the rule that the provision by the parent 
of the child's support during substantially all of the period re-
quired by law is sufficient, but such a rule might only start rather 
than end the difficulties.78 
76 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3001 (male, 16; female, 17). 
77 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, Supp. 1955) §206.5; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §44:1-141. 
There is a similar provision in the Michigan criminal statute penalizing children who 
do not support their indigent parents. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.139. This pro-
vision was before the state supreme court at a time when it also provided for civil lia-
bility. In re Shassberger, 257 Mich. 1, 239 N.W. 862 (1932). The facts of the case ~e 
found not to warrant the application of the statutory exception. 
78 Other difficulties might be imagined. The children might be excused from the 
support duty if the father's failure to support resulted from loss of employment in a 
period of economic depression. The courts, however, might make the statutory exception 
inapplicable if the parent's failure to support was not his fault. But what is fault? 
The Indiana criminal statute penalizing children who do not support their parents 
contains a similar clause. Any children "who have not lived with or who have not been 
supported by their parents when such children were minors" are excused from the penal-
ties imposed by the act. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1942) §10-1410. The Indiana Supreme 
Court has held that the statute requires children to be supported throughout their 
minority. Hindman v. State, 221 Ind. 6ll, 50 N.E. (2d) 913 (1943); Lanham v. State, 208 
Ind. 79, 194 N.E. 625, 195 N.E. 73 (1935). After these decisions were rendered it was the 
opinion of administrative officials in Indiana that the support duty under the statute had 
in fact been eliminated, on the ground that most children had been self-supporting, at 
one time or another, during their minority. Heavin, "Recipients and/or Versus Respon-
sible Relatives," 55 PUBLIC WELFARE IN INDIANA, No. 5, p. 9 (May 1945). The statute 
imposing civil liability was enacted in 1947. See note 76 supra. 
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The real difficulty with cases and statutes which suspend the 
support duty in the event of the dependent's misconduct is that 
they attempt to relate the support duty to the concept of fault. 
But the difficulty is that of trying to assess fault in the family situ-
ation. Social work theory emphasizes the interdependent nature 
of family relationships.79 The child, for example, who rebels 
against his parents, leaves home, and embarks on an irresponsible 
existence might well be considered to have forfeited his claim for 
aid fro~ his parents. But it should be recognized that in cases 
such as this it is the parent-child relationship that is faulty, and 
not necessarily the individuals in question. 
The statutory bad conduct exception is sensible, nevertheless, 
since its effect is to relieve the relative of support in a situation 
which is fraught with tension. In such cases, either the family 
circle has been broken by a permanent· abandonment, or the 
dependent person has perpetrated some real or alleged misdeed 
that makes it difficult for the relative to meet his obligations.80 
Problems of this kind might better be handled by a frank recogni-
tion of the necessity of excusing from the duty of support any 
individuals who face real emotional difficulties in trying to comply 
with it.81 The statute might authorize the court to suspend the 
support duty in any case where to enfor:ce it might harm further 
an already ruptured family relationship.82 Were this suggestion 
adopted, no further exceptions would have to be made for the 
4 'bad" person who seeks support. 
B. The Relative's Ability to Pay 
Vagueness in the statutory standard for determining what rel-
atives are liable to give family support has produced some of the 
most difficult problems of interpretation under the family respon-
sibili~y laws. Most of the contemporary American statutes have 
79 See, e.g., HAMILTON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIAL CAsEWORK, 2d ed., 276 
(1951). This interdependence seems to have been sensed by one judge who remarked that 
the reluctance of a son to support his father may be due to the fact that the parent had 
not provided his children "with a basis for a moral sense." Hommel v. Hommel, 22 
N.Y.S. (2d) 977 at 979 (1940). 
80 In one case, for example, it was claimed that the parent seeking support had 
favored some of the children over the others. Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 192 Misc. 1014, 
80 N.Y.S. (2d) 913 (1948). Apparently, family tension was the result of sibling rivalries. 
81 See the discussion in BISNO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL WORK 43 (1952); TOWLE, 
COMMON HUMAN NEEDS 83 (1952). 
82 A start in this direction has been made by the Indiana statute. In assessing the 
child's duty to support his parents, the court is to consider the "treatment given such 
child or children by the parent or parents when obligated to support such child or chil-
dren." Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3005. 
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adopted the generalized prescription of the English law and apply 
to any relative of "sufficient ability." Sometimes the statutory 
language has been modified slightly, requiring, for example, con-
tribution from the relative who is "financially able" to pay.83 Two 
states, Montana and Oregon, have solved the problems of inter-
pretation raised by statutes based on the English model by enacting 
a statutory scale to determine the con,tributions to be made by 
responsible relatives.84 However, this type of law, while giving 
definiteness to the statutory requirement, is somewhat inflexible 
because the amount of the contribution is fixed for each income 
category,85 and such a law may become obsolete because of changes 
in the cost of living index. 
Under the typical family responsibility act, therefore, it is up to 
the courts to give more specific content to the ability-to-pay re-
quirement by providing more specific standards by which the 
finding of fact as to ability to pay can be made.86 While not much 
ss The following are examples of statutes that have modified the English definition 
while not altering it substantially: Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1951) §70-605 ("reasonably 
able" to give support); Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) c. 298, §12, 290 ("financial ability''); Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (a) ("sufficient financial ability''). There are some 
statutes which merely provide that the relative must have the "ability" to pay. Idaho Code 
Ann. (1948) §32-1002; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §13:4731. 
On the other hand there are two jurisdictions where the responsibility for support 
of relatives in need does not seem to be based upon the relative's ability to pay. Miss. 
Code Ann. (1952) §7357; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §109.010 (statute limited to reciprocal 
duty of parent and child). There is some indication, however, that a court will import the 
ability-to-pay requirement even if it is not specifically included. See Cherokee Co. v •. 
Smith, 219 Iowa 490, 258 N.W. 182 (1935), importing an ability-to-pay requirement into 
a statute authorizing the recovery of past assistance expenditures, although it was omitted 
from this provision. The section authorizing the assessment of prospective liability con-
tained such a requirement, and the court pointed out that the failure to read it into the 
other section would allow the locality to sue parents who were not of sufficient ability by 
withholding suit until aid had been given. For a case indicating that ability to pay will 
be interpreted differently under the Aid to Dependent Children statute, see Common-
wealth v. Hornacek, 347 Pa. 596, 32 A. (2d) 761 (1943). 
84 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-235; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.425. Contribu-
tions under these statutes are based on income as reported for state income taxation 
purposes, and vary with the number of dependents. 
85 Both statutes, however, authorize the welfare department to require less than the 
prescribed statutory amount if the circumstances of the case warrant. Mont. Rev. Code 
Ann. (1953) §71-234; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.420. 
86 The question of ability to pay is for the trier of fact under all of the circum-
stances of the case. Bradley v. Fenn, 103 Conn. 1, 130 A. 126 (1925); Kane v. Brown, 23 
N.Y.S. (2d) 968 (1940); In re Conklin, 78 Misc. 269, 139 N.Y.S. 449 (1912). The burden 
to prove ability to support is on -the dependent. Nixon v. McCoy, 155 Minn. 175, 193 
N.W. 40 (1923). For a case indicating the particularized character of decisions on the 
question of ability to pay, see Winchester v. Burlington, 128 Conn. 185, 21 A. (2d) 371 
(1941) (whether ownership of property indicates sufficient ability depends on circum-
stances). Could a transfer of property by a responsible relative, made to evade his sup-
port duty, be set aside as fraudulent? In Commonwealth v. Wright, 28 Del. (Pa.) 522 
(1939), the relative had property which produced income sufficient to support his needy 
daughter. However, prior to the daughter's application for support he had transfep-ed 
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in the way of authoritative precedent can be derived from family 
support cases, since all of them are so dependent on their particular 
facts, it is still possible to ascertain what the courts consider the 
lower and upper limits of the ability principle. With reference to 
the lower limits, there is authority to the effect that a relative 
cannot be called upon for support if, as a result, he in tum would 
be "pauperized," i.e., for<;:ed to rely on assistance. In many of 
these cases the relatives sought to be held is an older person, and 
the courts seem to be conscious of the fact that, since his earning 
capacity is limited, depriving him of savings or income from in-
vestments would only have the effect of creating another public 
assistance client.87 This rule has the effect of prescribing a mini-
mum level of existence for the allegedly responsible relative, 
since the meaning of these opinions can be taken to be that one 
who himself is near the subsistence level is excused from support.88 
Another inference from these , cases is that the responsible 
relative is entitled to a standard of living over and beyond what 
is required for subsistence without being responsible for the sup-
port of needy relatives. This level of living might be considered 
the upper limit of the ability principle, the point beyond which 
the responsible relative must contribute to the support of the 
dependent person. How the courts define this upper limit is 
summed up by those cases which have held that the phrase 
"sufficient ability" means that a responsible relative may have 
all of the property to his second wife. Although the court admitted that the conveyance 
was probably not fraudulent, because the transfer was made when the daughter could 
support herself, it held that it could "look behind fiction" and determine the "actual 
status" of the parties. 
87 Barcelo v. Barcelo, 175 La. 398, 143 S. 354 (1932) (older person); Rotina v. Rotina, 
204 Misc. 291, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 66 (1953) (same); In re Diele's Estate, 187 Misc. 196, 61 
N.Y.S. (2d) 397 (1946); In re Tarantino's Estate, 183 Misc. 288, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 546 (1944), 
"affd. 271 App. Div. 780, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 410 (1946) (older person); In re Claiborn's Estate, 
51 N.Y.S. (2d) 543 (1944) (semble); Application of Bauer, 266 App. Div. 816, 41 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 626 (1943), affd. per curiam 291 N.Y. 711, 52 N.E. (2d) 597 (1943); Montgomery 
County Poor Directors v. Boorse, 10 Pa. D. & C. 745 (1927); Commonwealth v. Spaar, 8 
Pa. Dist. 380 (1899) (older person); Bradford Co. Poor District v. Case, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
644 (1886) (same). In Anon. v. Anon., 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 30 (1940), the deciding factor in a 
decision that the allegedly responsible relative was not able to pay seemed to be the fact 
that he was an older person who merely was provided for in a comfortable way for his 
old age. See, however, Kane v. Brown, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 968 (1940). There, because the 
grandparents would probably be on the relief rolls eventually an}"lvay, the court held that 
they had to share what they had left with their grandchildren who were claiming support. 
88 Indeed, this seems to be the rule in New Hampshire, where the court applies to 
the relative sought to be held responsible the same test it applies to a needy person seek-
ing assistance, that resources needed for a bare subsistence cannot be reached. Litchfield 
v. Londonderry, 39 N.H. 247 (1859). 
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enough for his own needs and "something over."89 It is the 
"something" over the "something over," then, to which the de-
pendent person is entitled. 
A similar approach has been taken by other cases, which have 
held that the dependent's claim must be rejected if it reduces the 
"comfortable support" of the responsible relative,90 and this latter 
standard has been enacted into statute in a few states.91 Unfor-
tunately, these statutory provisions have not been judicially inter-
preted. 
Even these somewhat more specific judicial and statutory stand-
ards, therefore, are not too helpful, since their components have 
not been separated for definition by the courts. A simple solution 
would be available if ability to pay under the statute were de-
fined by the debtors' exemption laws, the dependent person being 
entitled to anything over what these laws would allow to the 
responsible relative in the way of assets and income. But this 
position was rejected by the only court which appears to have 
considered it.92 For one thing, it runs counter to the intimation 
in the cases that a relative is entitled to something more than a 
minimum existence, which the exemption laws generally contem-
plate. 
Consequently, the content of the ability-to-pay concept remains 
substantially undefined. All that may be added to these general 
rules are the decisions of some courts that seem to have frowned 
on a level of conspicuous consumption by the relative sought to 
be charged, and the fact that the relative was buying a new car or 
television set has counted against him.93 Further, there have been 
89 In re Miller's Estate, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 258 (1946); Copeland v. Weber, 175 Misc. 403, 
24 N.Y.S. (2d) 590 (1940). 
:90 Templeton v. Stratton, 128 Mass. 137 (1880); Colebrook v. Stewartstown, 30 N.H. 
9 (1854). Cf. Bradley v. Fenn, 103 Conn. 1, 130 A. 126 (1925) (reasonable support). 
91 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18 ("reasonable subsistence compatible with decency 
and health''); Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88 ("of sufficient earning capacity or income, 
after reasonably providing for his own immediate family''). The New Hampshire pro-
vision seems to be an attempt to codify the rule of the case cited in note 90 supra. At 
the time of that decision the statute in that state was a copy of the English statute {rela-
tives of "sufficient ability''). New York has enacted a provision of this type to govern the 
support obligations of infants. N.Y. Social Welfare Law (Supp. 1955) §101 (4). See also 
Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §§83-608, 83-610 (state department of welfare to determine 
relative's ability to pay). 
:92 Copeland v. Weber, 175 Misc. 403, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 590 (1940). 
93 Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 686, 200 S. 4 (1941) (new car); Application of Machabee, 
205 Misc. 85, 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 634 (1954) (car and television set); Application of Rickey, 
126 N.Y.S. (2d) 261 (1953) (new car). Cf. Application of Burg, 136 N.Y.S. (2d) 94 (1954). 
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decisions which, without saying why, have held that certain re-
sources are not subject to support claims, such as the cash reserves 
of life insurance policies.94 
The courts have not been too explicit, either, as to the particu-
lar assets that are available to support the dependent person. This 
problem seems to revolve around the question of whether the rela-
tive's capital accumulation is available to support the dependent 
or whether the dependent may seek support out. of the relative's 
net income only. The cases are divided on this point. Some courts 
take the position that the savings of the relative may be taken into 
consideration. Some of these cases reason that the court making 
an award for present support cannot take. future contingencies 
into consideration, and that the court is ·always open to the rela-
tive who claims that the decree should be modified in light of 
changed circumstances.95 
Other cases, to the contrary, recognizing the need for savings 
against the perils of sickness and old age, have held that a depend-
ent person may claim support only out of the responsible rela-
tive's net income.96 Which is the better approach is hard to judge. 
94 In re Claiborn's Estate, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 543 (1944) (cash value of life insurance); 
Application of Dunaway, 174 Misc. 735, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 69 (1940) (alimony, because it is 
a resource earmarked only for the support of the mother and her children); Anon. v. 
Anon., 173 Misc. 679, is N.Y.S. (2d) 806 (1940) (contingent remainderman's interest in 
real property). In Barcelo v. Barcelo, 175 La. 398, 143 S. 354 (1932), the court held that 
the· responsible relative did not have to dispose of residential property in a depressed 
market at a sacrifice price. 
95 Bradley v. Fenn, 103 Conn. 1, 130 A. 126 (1925); Sussex Co. v. Jacobs, 11 Del. 330 
(1881); Chapin v. McCurdy, 196 Mass. 63, 81 N.E. 653 (1907); Templeton v. Stratton, 
128 Mass. 137 (1880); In re Modafferi's Estate, 174 Misc. 789, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 88 (1940); 
In re Whitesell, 18 Pa. Dist. 520 (1909). The Pennsylvania court placed its decision on 
the ground that the income from manual labor was too uncertain. See also Ind. Stat. 
Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3001 (ability depends on "property, income or earnings"); Iowa 
Code Ann. (1949) §252.5 (grandparents liable for support only "if . of ability without 
personal labor''). 
96 Colebrook v. Stewartstown, 30 N.H. 9 (1854); Dover v. McMurphy, 4 N.H. 158 
(1827); In re Miller's Estate, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 258 (1946); In re Diele's Estate, 187 Misc. 
196, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 397 (1946). This seems to be the purpose of the Wisconsin statute. 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (4) places the support duty on relatives, "if of sufficient ability 
(having due regard for their own future maintenance and making reasonable allowance 
for the protection of the property and investments from which they derive their living 
and their care and protection in old age)." 
The cases cited above do not mean, however, that the dependent person may compel 
the responsible relative to labor if this would be a hardship for him. See Rosen v. Rosen, 
91 N.Y.S. (2d) 208 (1949); Alessandro v. Camelli, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 237 (1944). In each case 
the court held that a mother kept at home with children does not have to leave them 
without maternal care when the only way in which she could meet her support obliga-
tion would be to seek employment. Compare these cases with Monroe Co. v. Abegglen, 129 
Iowa 53, 105 N.W. 350 (1905). But d. Howard Co. v. Enevoldsen, 118 Neb. 222, 224 
N.W. 280 (1929). 
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While it seems desirable to allow the responsible relative to keep 
intact a modest savings account, the latter decisions seem wrong 
if they mean that even extensive capital accumulations cannot 
be reached to satisfy the support obligation. However, requiring 
the payment of support out of one's income may work a real hard-
ship in some cases. 
It would seem possible to treat the concept of ability to pay 
more intelligently if it were recognized that the payment of sup-
port by any family of moderate means will usually result in hard-
ship. Where the line should be drawn as to what is "moderate" 
is a problem, but in today's high cost of living society any family 
of usual size, with an income of less than $5,000, will be hard put 
to provide in the customary manner for its own needs and yet 
meet the needs of dependent.relatives. If the family is forced to 
do so it will be compelled to sacrifice some other objective, such 
as the education of children, which the family considers essential 
to its growth and progress. This has been recognized in some 
early cases, which point out that taking all of the surplus income 
or capital of a family of moderate means will have the effect of 
killing initiative, incentive and the desire for self-betterment.97 
Any law which has this effect would appear to be undesirable. 
One way to avoid these difficulties would be to set up a standard 
that would allow the family of the relative called upon for support 
to devote its income to those expenditures it considers necessary. 
But a test of this nature is difficult to administer, since it must 
veer between giving full credit to a family's subjective decision 
as to its wants and an outsider's imposition of his own notions 
of what is required. A more workable suggestion would be the 
enactment of a flat exemption into the support law, all families 
earning less than this amount being excused from the support 
duty. 
Where to set this figure . is hard to determine, but it would 
seem fair to set a figure somewhat above the minimum budget for 
a family of four which has been estimated by the United States 
Department of Labor. This would put the figure at about $5,000.98 
97 See Dover v. McMurphy, 4 N.H. 158 (1827); Colebrook v. Stewartstown, 30 N.H. 
9 (1854). But cf. Application of Machabee, 205 Misc. 85, 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 634 (1954), 
where the court disregarded the fact that the debts of the relative claimed to be responsible 
had been incurred in the expansion of his business. This court felt that relieving the 
county of its relief expense took precedence over a debt of this nature. 
98 Shortly after the end of World War II the Bureau of Labor Statistics undertook 
a survey to determine how much annual income was needed, including an allowance for 
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The Oregon income scale approximates this figure since a family 
of four with a gross income bordering on $5,000 has to make only 
a slight contribution. If a method were found to revise the ex-
emption as needed, then this form of statute would avoid the 
inflexibility inherent in a statutory scale.99 
The liability of those families not within the exemption could 
then be handled on a case by case basis. The only difficult prob-
lems will arise with regard to relatives whose income is so close 
to the exemption that, while some contribution is expected, less 
than the full amount seems equitable in the particular case. The 
present family responsibility statutes assume, and most expressly 
provide, 100 that partial support of the dependent person may be 
ordered in cases where the responsible relative does not have the 
means adequate to provide full support. These provisions could 
be retained. 
What would be difficult to find, however, would be some way 
to reduce the contribution without adopting an inflexible scale or 
without leaving the decision to be made on an ad hoc basis. One 
possibility would be to. list those factors which could serve as the 
basis for a reduction in the amount of the contribution. For ex-
ample, the statute might provide that if, under the circumstances, 
insurances and taxes, to support a family of four. The study group, on the basis of 
technical advice, formulated a standard of living which was neither at the subsistence 
nor the luxury level, but at a point midway between. One of those who helped plan 
the project stated, "The point selected for measurement is in general the point where 
the struggle for 'more and more' things gives way to the desire for 'better and better' 
quality." Hinrichs, "The Budget in Perspective," 66 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 131 (1948). 
The study group found that this budget of goods and services would have cost an 
average of $3200 in most cities in June 1947. For a discussion of the methods followed 
in developing the budget see Kellogg and Brady, "The City Worker's Family Budget," 
66 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 133 (1948). The most recent estimate places the cost of the 
budget at an average of $4100. "City Worker's Family Budget for October, 1951," 74 
MONTHLY LAB. R.Ev. 520 (1952). 
99 Where general assistance is supervised at the state level, it would be possible to 
authorize the state department of welfare to set the exemption yearly with reference to 
the Labor Department figure and other relevant cost of living data. The exemption· 
might then be varied depending on the number of dependents in the family, the $5,000 
exemption, for example, ·being given only .to a family of four. 
100 See Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1951) §70-605; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §llllc; 
m. Ann. Stat. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §436-12; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3005; Iowa 
Code Ann. (1949) §252.8; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) arts. 231, 232; Me. Laws (1953) c. 
308, §99; Mass. Laws Ann. (1949) c. 117, §7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.126; 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-234; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §44:1-141; N.Y. Crim. 
Code (1945) §917; N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act (Supp. 1954) §101 (4); Ore. 
Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.420; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §5; Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, 
§§2, 3; Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88; W. Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (153); Wis. Stat. 
(1953) §52.01 (4). For cases awarding partial support, see Succession of Lyons, 22 La. 
Ann. 627 (1870); East Greenwich v. Card, I R.I. 409 (1850). 
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the exemption did not provide enough for the medical needs of 
the family, or for shelter, the contribution might be reduced 
accordingly. Perhaps this is all the statutory guidance that can 
be expected in such cases. There should, however, be no difficulty 
with reference to the particular resources, savings or income, 
which are available to pay support, provided the exemption level 
is set high enough to allow for reasonable savings and the purchase 
of adequate insurance. 
One other question remains to be considered in connection 
with the relative's liability for support. Some of the statutes pro-
vide that the duty to support attaches upon the relative's neglect 
to furnish support.101_ The phrase appears to mean simply that the 
action for support may be brought if the relative does not in fact 
provide it. The Connecticut court, however, has given it a differ-
ent meaning and has held that the mere fact of nonsupport is not 
enough, that the responsible relative must in addition have been 
guilty of some form of wrongdoing in withholding support. The 
content of this requirement is not too clear from the cases, although 
the court has said that the relative must have unreasonably with-
held support, and that, apparently, withholding aid in good faith 
would not amount to neglect under the statute.102 This approach, 
however, appears to be based on a misconception. The concept 
of culpability, while it may be an element of proof of responsibility 
under the desertion laws,103 does not seem to be an ingredient 
of the family responsibility provisions, as the latter seem to be 
aimed at imposing a duty of support irrespective of fault. 
101 E.g., Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, §13 (failure to support); Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 
1951) §70-605 (same); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §1 (failure or refusal); Conn. Stat. 
(Supp. 1953) §llllc (neglect to provide); Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501 (same); 
Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.6 (failure); Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.123 (same); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.01 (failure or refusal); Neb. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101 
(refusal); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18 (same); N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §44:1-141 
(refusal). 
102 In Rogers v. Kinnie, 134 Conn. 58, 54 A. (2d) 487 (1947), the court found that 
the children had acted unreasonably in not inquiring into the condition of their mother, 
who was in bad physical condition and in need of support. But cf. Tulin v. Tulin, 124 
Conn. 518, 200 A. 819 (1938), where the relative had already been providing support, 
but in a lesser amount than that demanded in the suit. Because no demand for a larger 
amount had been made, no neglect was found under the statute. Accord, Lathrop v. 
Lathrop, 78 Conn. 650, 63 A. 514 (1906). 
103 Compare, with the cases cited in the previous footnote, Milton v. Bruso, 111 
Vt. 82, 10 A. (2d) 203 (1940), construing the Vermont statute imposing on a husband 
liability for assistance rendered to a wife who has been abandoned. Vt. Laws (1953) 
No. 196, §1. 
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C. Nature of Support Furnished 
Once the court has determined that the dependent person in 
question is entitled to support, and that the relative alleged to be 
responsible is able to pay something toward it, the question next 
arises as to the degree of support that is to be given. As a rule, 
the statutes are not too helpful on this problem. Usually they 
leave the question unresolved, providing only that the relative 
shall "support" or "maintain" the person seeking aid.104 In some 
instances, they solve the problem by inflexibly :fixing the monthly 
contribution for all cases,105 or by setting a monthly maximum on 
the contribution.1°6 
Where the statute does not attempt to set the amount of sup-
port, but leaves the question open, it could be said that the relative 
need provide no more than would have been provided by way 
of relief, the purpose of the statute being simply to relieve the 
public of the support burden. There is authority to this effect.107 
But there is authority holding the other way, that the relative is 
entitled to be supported according to his needs, as determined by 
his requirements and his station in life.108 
104 E.g., Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501 ("reasonable monthly sum"); Hawaii 
Rev. Laws (1945) c. 298; §12,290 (sum necessary for "maintenance and support''); Ill. 
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §439·2 (similar); Ind. Ann. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §3-3005 
(similar, needs of dependent persons also to be considered); N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) 
§44:1-141 (sum sufficient to maintain dependent and relieve public of the burden). The 
last-cited provision seems subject to conflicting interpretations. 
See, for a variation in this pattern, N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act (Supp. 
1954) §101 (4). After providing that the relatives named are liable to support persons 
unable to maintain themselves and likely to become public charges, the statute states 
that the support award is to be determined "in view of the needs of the petitioner and 
the other circumstances of the case and their respective means." For interpretations of 
this provision see the cases cited in note 107 infra. 
105 This is the effect of the contribution scale fixed by the Montana and Oregon 
statutes. Under the Oregon statute the relative is liable in some cases for "total cost," 
and this is defined as the cost of public assistance. Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.425 (2) (c). 
See also Ala. Code (1940) tit. 44, §8 ($20); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §1 (same); 
Miss. Code Ann. (1952) §7357 ($10). These are all statutes providing for the payment 
of a sum of money to the locality to compensate it for aid given. 
106 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.01 ($25); Neb. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101 
(same); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §17-14-1 ($20). These statutes also provide for the 
payment of a sum of money to the locality to compensate it for aid previously given. 
:101 Monson v. Williams, 72 Mass. 416 (1856); Anon. v. Anon., 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 514 
(1940), construing N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act §137 (4), making the liability 
of a spouse for the support of the other dependent on the likelihood of the latter's 
becoming a public charge. Since the need for assistance is the basis for the liability, 
the court held that support is to be given on this basis. Apparently, the liability of a 
stepparent under this statute is likewise so limited for the same reason. D.G. v. Hennanez, 
204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1953). Cf. Clinton v. Laning, 61 Mich. 355, 28 N.W. 
125 (1886). 
10s Tulin v. Tulin, 124 Conn. 518, 200 A. 819 (1938); Rosen v. Rosen, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 
1956] FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 529 
To the extent that the family responsibility laws impose a 
support liability on the members , of the interdependent family 
living together as a unit, e.g., of the husband to the wife, support 
may well be awarded on a station-in-life basis.109 To the extent 
that family responsibility statutes cover the relatives who are in-
dependent of the person seeking support, however, the logic of 
the cases that require only a support on a public assistance budget 
basis seems justified. An exception might be made in cases in-
volving a parent and adult child, where one is seeking support 
from the other, since there the closeness of the relationship would 
seem to justify support at a higher level. 
Of course, the amount of the support award will depend in 
large part on the relative's means. It is only where the relative 
is fairly well-to-do that the problem just discussed would seem to 
be acute.. From this perspective the position taken still seems 
justified, since there would seem to be no reason for allowing a 
dependent person to share in the relative's affluence unless the 
closeness of the relationship would make it fair that he be allowed 
to do so. 
Probably of more common occurrence is the relative of moderate 
means, who, although liable for some contribution under the 
statute, is hard put to make it. There, the more important ques-
tion that will arise regarding the nature of the support given will 
be whether the responsible relative can support the dependent 
in his own home. There are some statutes which authorize the 
court, in its discretion, to order support in the home,110 and even 
208 (1949); Panzo v. Panzo, 192 Misc. 989, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 228 (1948); Caplan v. Caplan, 
177 Misc. 847, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 43 (1942); Dooley v. Dooley, 174 Misc. IO, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 
562 (1940); Szilagyi v. Szilagyi, 170 Misc. 1009, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 469 (1939), affd. on other 
grounds 257 App. Div. 630, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 107 (1939); Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. 
v. Eaton, 171 Va. 255, 198 S.E. 496 (1936). But d. Belden v. Belden, 82 Conn. 611, 74 
A. 896 (1909), where the court seemed to adopt a vague standard between the public 
assistance level and what the claimant was accustomed to expect. 
The New York cases construed N. Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act (Supp. 
1954) §101 (4), making the parents, grandparents, and children liable for the support of 
dependent persons unable to maintain themselves and likely to become a public charge. 
See, however, D. G. v. Hermanez, 204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1953), where the 
judge indicates that some cases have held that grandparents need support grandchildren 
only on a public assistance basis. See also Whitney v. Harrison, 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 227 
(1953) (dictum, public charge basis). The Louisiana Civil Code appears to require 
support on the station-in-life basis. La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) arts. 230, 231. 
109 The cases do not seem to make this distinction. In Monson v. Williams, 72 
Mass. 416 (1856), for example, where the relationship was that of husband and wife, 
support was awarded on a public assistance basis. 
110 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.8; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) art. 233; Me. Laws 
(1953) c. 308, §97; Mass. Ann. Laws (1949) c. 117, §9; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §5; 
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in the absence of an explicit provision the court might well be 
found to have implied authority to make such an order. But the 
more serious question is raised by the relative who claims that he 
has satisfied his support obligation by offering to support the de-
pendent in his own home although this offer is refused and that 
the court therefore is without authority to order financial support. · 
On this question the cases seem to hold that support in the home 
will excuse the relative from a financial contribution only if the 
home offers both physically adequate and personally congenial 
surroundings to the dependent. 
In what is perhaps the leading case on this subject, Condon v. 
Pomroy-Grace,111 the Connecticut court found that an offer to 
support an aged mother in the home of the daughter did not re-
lieve the daughter of her duty to support. Although the home 
was materially adequate and apparently quite comfortable, the 
court found that the daughter had made the situation so uncom-
fortable to her mother in a personal way that the house had become 
"hateful" to the older woman. In a later case the same court re-
jected an offer of a husband to support his wife in his home on the 
ground that not even the physical necessities were offered to her.112 
There are decisions, on the other hand, in which· the offer of 
support in the home has been found to satisfy the support obliga-
tion. Because most of them involve situations where the relative 
has provided a congenial and suitable environment, they are not 
in fact inconsistent with the Connecticut decisions.113 Most of those 
cases also deal with the obligation of a child to support his aging 
dependent parent. 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (7) (reasonable amount may be deducted for expected contribu-
tion in exchange for care in home). The Louisiana provision was applied in Schmidt 
v. Schmidt, 39 La. Ann. 982, 3 S. 225 (1887). But cf. W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (150) 
("a relative shall not be compelled to receive the indigent person in his own home"). 
N .Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act §92 (6) provides that a wife may be entitled 
to support though living away from her home, if she had to leave because of her hus-
band's cruel and inhuman treatment. This has been interpreted to relieve the husband 
of his support duty if he has made a bona fide offer to support the wife in the home, 
and is able to support her, provided that the conduct of the husband does not consti-
tute grounds for separation. Jokai v. Jokai, 121 N.Y.S. (2d) 517 (1953); Salvatore v. 
Salvatore, 185 Misc. 309, 57 N.Y.S. (2d) 564 (1945). 
::r.1173 Conn. 607, 48 A. 756 (1901). The court commented (at 757), "The law does 
not force a parent to become the unhappy prisoner of a thankless child, as the only 
alternative of starvation." The relative in In re O'Donnell, 126 Pa. 155, 19 A. 42 (1889), 
raised the same defense made by the relative in the Condon case, but it was dismissed 
as not timely. 
112 Belden v. Belden, 82 Conn. 611, 74 A. 896 (1909). 
113 Most of these are early New York cases. Duel v. Lamb, 1 Thomp. &: Cook (N.Y.) 
66 (1873); Converse v. McArthur, 17 Barb. (N.Y.) 410 (1854). These cases appear to be 
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What attitude the courts should adopt toward defenses of this 
type would seem to vary with the relationship that is involved. In 
view of the size of the typical urban dwelling, for example, it may 
be expecting too much for three generations to live under one 
roof, so that a court might be justified in refusing an offer by a 
married son or daughter to take in a parent where the parent 
objects. Even though the offer is voluntarily made, the fact that 
one party to the arrangement is not willing is indicative of poten-
tial difficulties in adjustment.114 Where the relationship between 
the parties is strained, the court that compels the dependent person 
to accept the relative's offer is merely forcing the creation of an 
unhealthy home environment. These considerations are particu-
larly important when children are involved. 
However, if the persons involved can live under one roof, 
without psycho-social damage to other parties, then there would 
seem to be no objection to allowing support in the home in ful-
fillment of the obligation. Again this approach subordinates the 
aim of relieving the public of expense to that of furthering good 
family relationships. For if the relative who offers support in his 
home is compelled to make a financial contribution, the chances 
of his defaulting in meeting the support order, and of the com-
munity's having to assume the relief burden, would seem con-
siderable. 
This discussion of the nature of the support duty has revealed 
what may well be unavoidable ambiguities in the family responsi-
bility laws. That there will have to be a considerable amount of 
leeway in fixing responsibility for support under the statute seems 
based in part on a provision existing in the statute at that time which authorized the 
overseer of the poor, then the official in charge of general assistance, to approve the 
manner of support that was offered. See Aldridge v. Walker, 151 N.Y. 527, 45 N.E. 950 
(1897). No such provision appears in the present New York family support laws. 
For this reason, these cases may no longer be good law. See Hodson v. Holmes, 
162 Misc. 226, 294 N.Y.S. 537 (1937), holding, without discussion, that an offer to support 
in the home is not a good defense to a support action. See also Neuerstein v. Newburger, 
53 N.Y.S. (2d) 906 (1945), implying that the earlier cases may no longer be controlling 
in view of modern living conditions. This case limited its decision, however, to a 
holding that the early cases did not sanction a son's placing his aging father in a home 
for old people, in satisfaction of his support obligation. 
The Colorado court, in a brief opinion in Phillips Co. v. Kohrell, 100 Colo. 445, 
68 P. (2d) 32 (1937), held that it was for the jury to decide whether a son's offer to support 
his father in his home satisfied the support obligation. But no standards were given for 
jury guidance in future cases. Cf. Commonwealth v. Spaar, 8 Pa. Dist. 380 (1899). 
114 See the discussion in Neuerstein v. Newburger, 53 N.Y.S. (2d) 906 (1945). Cf. 
Field v. Field, 79 Misc. 557, 139 N.Y.S. 673 (1913) (wife entitled to separation because 
mother-in-law interfered with management of household). 
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inevitable. What is needed is an attempt to give as much objec-
tivity to the statute as is possible without creating inflexibility. If 
the ability of responsible relatives to contribute is viewed realis-
tically, and if support is decreed on a public assistance basis except 
where the family relationship is close, then, assuming there are no 
severe family tensions, enforcement of the family responsibility 
law should not work an undue hardship. 
[ To be concluded ] 
